Verify and integrate VEUR

What a EUR stablecoin user should check before choosing VEUR, from public sources as of 14 Nov 2026. EUR stablecoins · Compare side by side

Issuer-statedVerified onchainThird-partyNot disclosed: nothing public says it.

Governance

From the reviewed token controls; chains nobody reviewed are not covered. Token controls

Summary

VNX euro token; services discontinued 2026Issuer-statedDetails

VEUR is the VNX group's euro token. VNX Commodities AG (Liechtenstein) said in April 2026 that its VEUR exchange services would be fully discontinued, and VEUR is not among the stablecoins listed in VNX Global Ltd.'s current terms; the contracts remain live on the chains below.

Issuer-statedvnx.li ↗prod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗

Issuer and licences

Legal entity
VNX Global Ltd. (VCHF, VGBP); VEUR unnamedIssuer-statedDetails

VNX Global Ltd. issues and redeems 'VNX Stablecoins' under its Terms and Conditions; their Annex II lists VGBP and VCHF. VNX Commodities AG (Liechtenstein, register no. FL0002.654.2718) publishes vnx.li and ran the vnx.li platform, including VEUR exchange services. The pages read do not name the entity that issued VEUR.

The token contracts' source header reads '(c) Copyright by VNX S.A, Luxembourg'. vnx.io (website, transparency and reserve pages), docs.vnx.io, the Bermuda Monetary Authority register (bma.bm) and the FMA Liechtenstein register could not be reached from this session (network allowlist).

Issuer-statedprod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗vnx.li ↗2 ↗3 ↗

Jurisdiction
Bermuda; LiechtensteinIssuer-statedDetails

Bermuda (VNX Global Ltd., company no. 202605548, registered office Park Place, 55 Par La Ville Road, Hamilton) and Liechtenstein (VNX Commodities AG; imprint postal address Im Schwibboga 7c, 9487 Gamprin-Bendern).

The Terms give VNX Commodities AG's registered office as Dr. Grass-Strasse 12, 9490 Vaduz; the imprint gives the Gamprin-Bendern postal address.

Issuer-statedprod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗vnx.li ↗

Regulator
Bermuda Monetary AuthorityIssuer-statedDetails

Bermuda Monetary Authority (VNX Global Ltd., Class M licence under the Digital Assets Business Act 2018). vnx.li says VNX Commodities AG 'operates within Liechtenstein's Blockchain Act framework' but names no supervisor or registration.

Not checked in the BMA or FMA registers (both blocked from this session). VNX is not listed in ESMA's interim MiCA register of e-money token white papers (EMTWP.csv, read 2026-11-14).

Issuer-statedprod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗vnx.li ↗2 ↗

Licences
BMA Class M DABA licenceIssuer-statedDetails

VNX Global Ltd.: Class M Digital Assets Business Licence from the Bermuda Monetary Authority under the Digital Assets Business Act 2018 (Terms; news notice of 12 May 2026); VNX Commodities AG: operates within Liechtenstein's Blockchain Act (TVTG) framework; no registration number given

Licence numbers and scope not checked: bma.bm and the FMA register were blocked. Absent from ESMA's MiCA EMT white-paper register (EMTWP.csv).

Issuer-statedprod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗vnx.li ↗2 ↗

Website
vnx.liIssuer-statedDetails

https://vnx.li/

FXscan's issuer links list vnx.io; vnx.io was blocked from this session. The Terms point to vnx.li for VNX Commodities AG and to my.vnx.io for the issuing platform.

Issuer-statedvnx.li ↗prod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗

FXscan licence check

Licensed · BMA (Bermuda) · VNX Global Ltd. (Bermuda co. no. 202605548)

Class M digital asset business licence from the BMA, per the issuer.

Source: vnx.io ↗ · Checked 31 Oct 2026

Funding and ownership

Parent
VNX group; parent entity unnamedIssuer-statedDetails

VNX group. The news page calls VNX Global Ltd. 'a VNX Group entity'; the Terms call VNX Commodities AG a 'VNX group company'. No group parent entity is named.

Issuer-statedvnx.li ↗prod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗

Funding
Not disclosedChecked
Partners
Not disclosedChecked

The Terms say customer fiat is held at 'one or several banking or payment institutions' without naming them.

Checkedprod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗vnx.li ↗

Reserves

Backing
Not disclosedChecked

VNX Global's current Terms (Annex II) list only VGBP and VCHF, and the vnx.io transparency page was blocked from this session.

Checkedprod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗vnx.li ↗

Allocation
Not disclosedChecked

VNX Global's current Terms (Annex II) list only VGBP and VCHF, and the vnx.io transparency page was blocked from this session.

Checkedprod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗

Custodian
Not disclosedChecked
Segregation
Not disclosedChecked
Attestation
Not disclosedChecked

VNX Global's current Terms (Annex II) list only VGBP and VCHF, and the vnx.io transparency page was blocked from this session.

Checkedprod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗

Proof of reserve
Not disclosedChecked

Mint and redeem

Who can
Not disclosedChecked

VEUR is not among the stablecoins in VNX Global's Terms (Annex II).

Checkedvnx.li ↗prod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗

Process
VEUR services discontinued in 2026Issuer-statedDetails

VNX Commodities AG said on 22 Apr 2026 that its VEUR exchange services would be fully discontinued and asked holders to settle arrangements by 22 May 2026. Exchange operations on the vnx.li platform were suspended from 30 Jun 2026 18:00 CET, with withdrawals until 31 Jul 2026.

Issuer-statedvnx.li ↗

Speed
Not disclosedChecked

Checkedvnx.li ↗

Minimums
Any holder at par
Not disclosedChecked

No current VEUR redemption route or terms were found on the pages read.

Checkedvnx.li ↗prod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗

FXscan's how-to-get summary

How to get VEUR

Who can mint
Businesses only
Mint
Verified VNX customers fund a segregated fiat account; VNX mints VCHF on receipt. The same process applies to every VNX stablecoin.
Redeem
Verified customers redeem 1:1 for fiat through VNX.
Payment rails
SEPASWIFT

Also available on

Compiled 23 Sep 2026 from public issuer information (vnx.io, x.com, academy.swissborg.com, vnx.gitbook.io). Not advice. Confirm with the issuer before sending funds. Report a correction.

Token controls

ChainAdminUpgradeablePauseFreezeMint
ArbitrumSingle keyVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyAllowanceVerified onchain
AvalancheSingle keyVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyAllowanceVerified onchain
BaseSingle keyVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyAllowanceVerified onchain
CeloSingle keyVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyAllowanceVerified onchain
EthereumSingle keyVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyAllowanceVerified onchain
PolygonSingle keyVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyAllowanceVerified onchain
SolanaSingle keyVerified onchainNoVerified onchainNoVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyUncappedVerified onchain
StellarSingle keyVerified onchainNoVerified onchainNoVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyUncappedVerified onchain

Not reviewed yet: Q.

Contracts and full control facts

Arbitrum

0x4883c8f0529f37e40ebea870f3c13cdfad5d01f8
Upgradeable
Yes, by a single keyVerified onchainDetails

Yes. TransparentUpgradeableProxy: EIP-1967 implementation 0xd3bfc79d720bc625d02dc46d822040ac7cb5045a (VNXCToken); admin slot holds ProxyAdmin 0x3d38309d072d2b6125fca946f78b6ebf950a7165, whose owner() is EOA 0xd5086f514af5d820ee58a73e9628b5d21f3ba54a, so that one key can upgrade the token. Event history was not read on this chain (public RPC log limits).

Verified onchainarb1.arbitrum.io ↗

Pause
YesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. pause()/unpause() need the asset-protection role; assetProtectionRoleId() = 0, the Superadmin role of RBAC contract 0xd4e94d74bf5be456efe46496158f6b38549b9cc2. Pause blocks transfers, approvals, mints and burns. paused() = false on 2026-11-14.

Verified onchainarb1.arbitrum.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Yes, incl. seizing frozen balancesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. freeze()/unFreeze() by the asset-protection role (Superadmin); a frozen address cannot send, receive or approve, and reclaimTokensFromFrozenAddress() moves a frozen address's whole balance to the caller. Every transfer also calls the transfer provider 0x2cf31b8c4b4da736ce551db514258f5a567225d6 (VNXAnyTransferProvider, which approves all transfers), and the Superadmin can swap it (changeTransferProvider).

Verified onchainarb1.arbitrum.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Mint authority
Single key; allowance it can raiseVerified onchainDetails

mint() needs role 0 ('Superadmin') in 0xd4e94d74bf5be456efe46496158f6b38549b9cc2 and is limited by a per-minter allowance, which the Superadmin sets with configureMinter() (also for itself). Role 0 bearer(s): 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a, 0xd5086f514af5d820ee58a73e9628b5d21f3ba54a (EOA). Remaining allowance on 2026-11-14: 0xd5086f514af5d820ee58a73e9628b5d21f3ba54a: 999,946,508 VEUR.

The allowance is a limit the admin sets for itself, not a cap fixed in the contract.

Verified onchainarb1.arbitrum.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Burn
Holders; minter with allowanceVerified onchainDetails

burn(): any holder can burn its own (unfrozen) balance. burnFrom(): only the minter role, and only up to the ERC-20 allowance the holder gave it.

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗

Admin
Single key (EOAs)Verified onchainDetails

EOA. Superadmin (role 0 of VNXManager 0xd4e94d74bf5be456efe46496158f6b38549b9cc2, bearersCount 2, both found): 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a and 0xd5086f514af5d820ee58a73e9628b5d21f3ba54a, each an EOA (eth_getCode = 0x). Either alone can pause, freeze, seize frozen balances and set minter allowances. ProxyAdmin owner (upgrades): EOA 0xd5086f514af5d820ee58a73e9628b5d21f3ba54a. Owner() is EOA 0xd5086f514af5d820ee58a73e9628b5d21f3ba54a; the owner can replace the RBAC contract (updateRBACAddress).

Verified onchainarb1.arbitrum.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Verified source
Yes (Sourcify exact match)Verified onchainDetails

Yes: implementation 0xd3bfc79d720bc625d02dc46d822040ac7cb5045a is an exact match on Sourcify (VNXCToken); its runtime bytecode is identical to the Ethereum implementation.

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗

Avalanche

0x7678e162f38ec9ef2bfd1d0aaf9fd93355e5fa0b
Upgradeable
Yes, by a single keyVerified onchainDetails

Yes. TransparentUpgradeableProxy: EIP-1967 implementation 0x832cba8c924b4e3128ab509a803d66738bc51708 (VNXCToken); admin slot holds ProxyAdmin 0x9b357fac02e035159dffad8dd21333e39f25a660, whose owner() is EOA 0xe13eb54fc8bcd06aed4c1ea13692ba85dc94fd8c, so that one key can upgrade the token. Event history was not read on this chain (public RPC log limits).

Verified onchainapi.avax.network ↗

Pause
YesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. pause()/unpause() need the asset-protection role; assetProtectionRoleId() = 0, the Superadmin role of RBAC contract 0x94b1fb4daa0097c9c31d6c7473122d1fdc7654bf. Pause blocks transfers, approvals, mints and burns. paused() = false on 2026-11-14.

Verified onchainapi.avax.network ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Yes, incl. seizing frozen balancesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. freeze()/unFreeze() by the asset-protection role (Superadmin); a frozen address cannot send, receive or approve, and reclaimTokensFromFrozenAddress() moves a frozen address's whole balance to the caller. Every transfer also calls the transfer provider 0x75203f0bbd2ba799086ba677da51a3f1fc4cbd26 (VNXAnyTransferProvider, which approves all transfers), and the Superadmin can swap it (changeTransferProvider).

Verified onchainapi.avax.network ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗

Mint authority
Single key; allowance it can raiseVerified onchainDetails

mint() needs role 0 ('Superadmin') in 0x94b1fb4daa0097c9c31d6c7473122d1fdc7654bf and is limited by a per-minter allowance, which the Superadmin sets with configureMinter() (also for itself). Role 0 bearer(s): 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a, 0xe13eb54fc8bcd06aed4c1ea13692ba85dc94fd8c (EOA). Remaining allowance on 2026-11-14: 0xe13eb54fc8bcd06aed4c1ea13692ba85dc94fd8c: 997,337,026 VEUR.

The allowance is a limit the admin sets for itself, not a cap fixed in the contract.

Verified onchainapi.avax.network ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗

Burn
Holders; minter with allowanceVerified onchainDetails

burn(): any holder can burn its own (unfrozen) balance. burnFrom(): only the minter role, and only up to the ERC-20 allowance the holder gave it.

Verified onchaineth.blockscout.com ↗

Admin
Single key (EOAs)Verified onchainDetails

EOA. Superadmin (role 0 of VNXManager 0x94b1fb4daa0097c9c31d6c7473122d1fdc7654bf, bearersCount 2, both found): 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a and 0xe13eb54fc8bcd06aed4c1ea13692ba85dc94fd8c, each an EOA (eth_getCode = 0x). Either alone can pause, freeze, seize frozen balances and set minter allowances. ProxyAdmin owner (upgrades): EOA 0xe13eb54fc8bcd06aed4c1ea13692ba85dc94fd8c. Owner() is EOA 0xe13eb54fc8bcd06aed4c1ea13692ba85dc94fd8c; the owner can replace the RBAC contract (updateRBACAddress).

Verified onchainapi.avax.network ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗

Verified source
Bytecode matches verified Ethereum codeVerified onchainDetails

Implementation 0x832cba8c924b4e3128ab509a803d66738bc51708 has no Sourcify record, but its runtime bytecode (eth_getCode) is identical to the verified Ethereum implementation VNXCToken 0xd1d7193ce1aa7808d577058f48ef8289fc2f81fc. Snowtrace was not checked.

Verified onchainapi.avax.network ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Base

0x4ed9df25d38795a47f52614126e47f564d37f347
Upgradeable
Yes, by a single keyVerified onchainDetails

Yes. TransparentUpgradeableProxy: EIP-1967 implementation 0x0d12d751e71dec6bfed7f5ac34b1fb8df4782ab1 (VNXCToken); admin slot holds ProxyAdmin 0x35bb28feef0499d7580ed8e8ef1a19ab346b79e8, whose owner() is EOA 0xd63052e09af164cef57695d3b96043ea848b051f, so that one key can upgrade the token. Event history was not read on this chain (public RPC log limits).

Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗

Pause
YesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. pause()/unpause() need the asset-protection role; assetProtectionRoleId() = 0, the Superadmin role of RBAC contract 0xc4c917fda20fc2f39c629c809c4c3662a8cf7d9d. Pause blocks transfers, approvals, mints and burns. paused() = false on 2026-11-14.

Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Yes, incl. seizing frozen balancesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. freeze()/unFreeze() by the asset-protection role (Superadmin); a frozen address cannot send, receive or approve, and reclaimTokensFromFrozenAddress() moves a frozen address's whole balance to the caller. Every transfer also calls the transfer provider 0xae80e93c53d813f6b9cd6ab06d088831effb649b (VNXAnyTransferProvider, which approves all transfers), and the Superadmin can swap it (changeTransferProvider).

Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Mint authority
Single key; allowance it can raiseVerified onchainDetails

mint() needs role 0 ('Superadmin') in 0xc4c917fda20fc2f39c629c809c4c3662a8cf7d9d and is limited by a per-minter allowance, which the Superadmin sets with configureMinter() (also for itself). Role 0 bearer(s): 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a, 0xd63052e09af164cef57695d3b96043ea848b051f (EOA). Remaining allowance on 2026-11-14: 0xd63052e09af164cef57695d3b96043ea848b051f: 999,087,718 VEUR.

The allowance is a limit the admin sets for itself, not a cap fixed in the contract.

Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Burn
Holders; minter with allowanceVerified onchainDetails

burn(): any holder can burn its own (unfrozen) balance. burnFrom(): only the minter role, and only up to the ERC-20 allowance the holder gave it.

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗

Admin
Single key (EOAs)Verified onchainDetails

EOA. Superadmin (role 0 of VNXManager 0xc4c917fda20fc2f39c629c809c4c3662a8cf7d9d, bearersCount 2, both found): 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a and 0xd63052e09af164cef57695d3b96043ea848b051f, each an EOA (eth_getCode = 0x). Either alone can pause, freeze, seize frozen balances and set minter allowances. ProxyAdmin owner (upgrades): EOA 0xd63052e09af164cef57695d3b96043ea848b051f. Owner() is EOA 0xd63052e09af164cef57695d3b96043ea848b051f; the owner can replace the RBAC contract (updateRBACAddress).

Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Verified source
Yes (Sourcify exact match)Verified onchainDetails

Yes: implementation 0x0d12d751e71dec6bfed7f5ac34b1fb8df4782ab1 is an exact match on Sourcify (VNXCToken); its runtime bytecode is identical to the Ethereum implementation.

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗

Celo

0x9346f43c1588b6df1d52bdd6bf846064f92d9cba
Upgradeable
Yes, by a single keyVerified onchainDetails

Yes. TransparentUpgradeableProxy: EIP-1967 implementation 0xf3e535d35b662015765a2d73e81db5735562b569 (VNXCToken); admin slot holds ProxyAdmin 0x20aac9439e48d4b26fd7fb8c1de1e037bee7827f, whose owner() is EOA 0xd83e515136abdd6e4c6606d9895109f19e78059a, so that one key can upgrade the token. Event history was not read on this chain (public RPC log limits).

Verified onchainforno.celo.org ↗

Pause
YesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. pause()/unpause() need the asset-protection role; assetProtectionRoleId() = 0, the Superadmin role of RBAC contract 0xfc4210a4e7484350f4a26ab76630b72cb1d50eee. Pause blocks transfers, approvals, mints and burns. paused() = false on 2026-11-14.

Verified onchainforno.celo.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Yes, incl. seizing frozen balancesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. freeze()/unFreeze() by the asset-protection role (Superadmin); a frozen address cannot send, receive or approve, and reclaimTokensFromFrozenAddress() moves a frozen address's whole balance to the caller. Every transfer also calls the transfer provider 0x974587a7227d11ce29826521bc46de491304796e (VNXAnyTransferProvider, which approves all transfers), and the Superadmin can swap it (changeTransferProvider).

Verified onchainforno.celo.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Mint authority
Single key; allowance it can raiseVerified onchainDetails

mint() needs role 0 ('Superadmin') in 0xfc4210a4e7484350f4a26ab76630b72cb1d50eee and is limited by a per-minter allowance, which the Superadmin sets with configureMinter() (also for itself). Role 0 bearer(s): 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a, 0xd83e515136abdd6e4c6606d9895109f19e78059a (EOA). Remaining allowance on 2026-11-14: 0xd83e515136abdd6e4c6606d9895109f19e78059a: 999,967,793 VEUR.

The allowance is a limit the admin sets for itself, not a cap fixed in the contract.

Verified onchainforno.celo.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Burn
Holders; minter with allowanceVerified onchainDetails

burn(): any holder can burn its own (unfrozen) balance. burnFrom(): only the minter role, and only up to the ERC-20 allowance the holder gave it.

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗

Admin
Single key (EOAs)Verified onchainDetails

EOA. Superadmin (role 0 of VNXManager 0xfc4210a4e7484350f4a26ab76630b72cb1d50eee, bearersCount 2, both found): 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a and 0xd83e515136abdd6e4c6606d9895109f19e78059a, each an EOA (eth_getCode = 0x). Either alone can pause, freeze, seize frozen balances and set minter allowances. ProxyAdmin owner (upgrades): EOA 0xd83e515136abdd6e4c6606d9895109f19e78059a. Owner() is EOA 0xd83e515136abdd6e4c6606d9895109f19e78059a; the owner can replace the RBAC contract (updateRBACAddress).

Verified onchainforno.celo.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Verified source
Yes (Sourcify exact match)Verified onchainDetails

Yes: implementation 0xf3e535d35b662015765a2d73e81db5735562b569 is an exact match on Sourcify (VNXCToken); its runtime bytecode is identical to the Ethereum implementation.

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗

Ethereum

0x6ba75d640bebfe5da1197bb5a2aff3327789b5d3
Upgradeable
Yes, by a single keyVerified onchainDetails

Yes. TransparentUpgradeableProxy: EIP-1967 implementation 0xd1d7193ce1aa7808d577058f48ef8289fc2f81fc (VNXCToken); admin slot holds ProxyAdmin 0xc8bb8eda94931ca2f20ef43ea7dbd58e68400400, whose owner() is EOA 0x7b0c15f39cd987a7d3f5d8d10b57ac6d633e9403, so that one key can upgrade the token. Upgraded events: 2022-11-18 (deployment), 2022-12-01, 2026-04-08 (to 0xd1d7193ce1aa7808d577058f48ef8289fc2f81fc).

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗

Pause
YesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. pause()/unpause() need the asset-protection role; assetProtectionRoleId() = 0, the Superadmin role of RBAC contract 0xcdb3867935247049e87c38ea270edd305d84c9ae. Pause blocks transfers, approvals, mints and burns. paused() = false on 2026-11-14. No Paused event in the token's log history.

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Yes, incl. seizing frozen balancesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. freeze()/unFreeze() by the asset-protection role (Superadmin); a frozen address cannot send, receive or approve, and reclaimTokensFromFrozenAddress() moves a frozen address's whole balance to the caller. Every transfer also calls the transfer provider 0xe4fadbbf24f118b1e63d65f1aac2a825a07f7619 (VNXAnyTransferProvider, which approves all transfers), and the Superadmin can swap it (changeTransferProvider). Address 0xe9759406924477c8a7923f78c40cf40d483d50d1 was frozen three times (2024) and is frozen now (isFrozen = true).

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗

Mint authority
Single key; allowance it can raiseVerified onchainDetails

mint() needs role 0 ('Superadmin') in 0xcdb3867935247049e87c38ea270edd305d84c9ae and is limited by a per-minter allowance, which the Superadmin sets with configureMinter() (also for itself). Role 0 bearer(s): 0x7b0c15f39cd987a7d3f5d8d10b57ac6d633e9403, 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a (EOA). Remaining allowance on 2026-11-14: 0x7b0c15f39cd987a7d3f5d8d10b57ac6d633e9403: 998,783,848 VEUR. VEUR on Ethereum still uses the old VNXManager; 0x45a149f42ff0b77d148d05904dd7577df36a545a was removed from its Superadmin role on 2026-10-09.

The allowance is a limit the admin sets for itself, not a cap fixed in the contract.

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗

Burn
Holders; minter with allowanceVerified onchainDetails

burn(): any holder can burn its own (unfrozen) balance. burnFrom(): only the minter role, and only up to the ERC-20 allowance the holder gave it.

Verified onchaineth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗

Admin
Single key (EOAs)Verified onchainDetails

EOA. Superadmin (role 0 of VNXManager 0xcdb3867935247049e87c38ea270edd305d84c9ae, bearersCount 2, both found): 0x7b0c15f39cd987a7d3f5d8d10b57ac6d633e9403 and 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a, each an EOA (eth_getCode = 0x). Either alone can pause, freeze, seize frozen balances and set minter allowances. ProxyAdmin owner (upgrades): EOA 0x7b0c15f39cd987a7d3f5d8d10b57ac6d633e9403. Owner() is the VNXManager contract 0xcdb3867935247049e87c38ea270edd305d84c9ae, whose Superadmins can hand ownership on (transferContractOwnership); the owner can replace the RBAC contract (updateRBACAddress).

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗

Verified source
YesVerified onchainDetails

Yes: proxy and implementation VNXCToken (solc 0.8.20, verified 2026-04-08) are verified on Blockscout.

Verified onchaineth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗

Polygon

0xe4095d9372e68d108225c306a4491cacfb33b097
Upgradeable
Yes, by a single keyVerified onchainDetails

Yes. TransparentUpgradeableProxy: EIP-1967 implementation 0x5cb0365674da4d167755bd3fb99a09916258ef32 (VNXCToken); admin slot holds ProxyAdmin 0xed69422ba3813968371ce9a55a8b40965725a117, whose owner() is EOA 0x88f239d6629e98d6828fdba8f8f415d4b903af4a, so that one key can upgrade the token. Event history was not read on this chain (public RPC log limits).

Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗

Pause
YesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. pause()/unpause() need the asset-protection role; assetProtectionRoleId() = 0, the Superadmin role of RBAC contract 0xbbe070a5f848b532fd4c9ceee77f66867fb70172. Pause blocks transfers, approvals, mints and burns. paused() = false on 2026-11-14.

Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Yes, incl. seizing frozen balancesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. freeze()/unFreeze() by the asset-protection role (Superadmin); a frozen address cannot send, receive or approve, and reclaimTokensFromFrozenAddress() moves a frozen address's whole balance to the caller. Every transfer also calls the transfer provider 0x62038353d464ed11c7eac16f91cc5c5fb9cf22de (VNXAnyTransferProvider, which approves all transfers), and the Superadmin can swap it (changeTransferProvider).

Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Mint authority
Single key; allowance it can raiseVerified onchainDetails

mint() needs role 0 ('Superadmin') in 0xbbe070a5f848b532fd4c9ceee77f66867fb70172 and is limited by a per-minter allowance, which the Superadmin sets with configureMinter() (also for itself). Role 0 bearer(s): 0x7b0c15f39cd987a7d3f5d8d10b57ac6d633e9403, 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a (EOA). Remaining allowance on 2026-11-14: 0x7b0c15f39cd987a7d3f5d8d10b57ac6d633e9403: 999,214,181 VEUR.

The allowance is a limit the admin sets for itself, not a cap fixed in the contract.

Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Burn
Holders; minter with allowanceVerified onchainDetails

burn(): any holder can burn its own (unfrozen) balance. burnFrom(): only the minter role, and only up to the ERC-20 allowance the holder gave it.

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗

Admin
Single key (EOAs)Verified onchainDetails

EOA. Superadmin (role 0 of VNXManager 0xbbe070a5f848b532fd4c9ceee77f66867fb70172, bearersCount 2, both found): 0x7b0c15f39cd987a7d3f5d8d10b57ac6d633e9403 and 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a, each an EOA (eth_getCode = 0x). Either alone can pause, freeze, seize frozen balances and set minter allowances. ProxyAdmin owner (upgrades): EOA 0x88f239d6629e98d6828fdba8f8f415d4b903af4a. Owner() is EOA 0x7b0c15f39cd987a7d3f5d8d10b57ac6d633e9403; the owner can replace the RBAC contract (updateRBACAddress).

Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Verified source
Yes (Sourcify exact match)Verified onchainDetails

Yes: implementation 0x5cb0365674da4d167755bd3fb99a09916258ef32 is an exact match on Sourcify (VNXCToken); its runtime bytecode is identical to the Ethereum implementation.

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗

Solana

C4Kkr9NZU3VbyedcgutU6LKmi6MKz81sx6gRmk5pX519
Upgradeable
NoVerified onchainDetails

No. Classic SPL Token mint (owner program TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA); the mint itself cannot be upgraded.

Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗

Pause
NoVerified onchainDetails

No. The classic SPL Token program has no pause.

Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗

Freeze / blacklist
YesVerified onchainDetails

Yes. freezeAuthority = 9GpoNWNZ8ZLEh8rKKQ358bngFWHmc6nKVcQ9SzCfvRmw; it can freeze any token account of this mint.

Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗

Mint authority
Single key, uncappedVerified onchainDetails

mintAuthority = 9GpoNWNZ8ZLEh8rKKQ358bngFWHmc6nKVcQ9SzCfvRmw, a plain system account (owner 11111111111111111111111111111111), so a single key. SPL Token has no supply cap.

Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗

Burn
Holders onlyVerified onchainDetails

Holders can burn their own tokens; the mint and freeze authority cannot burn other balances (no permanent delegate in classic SPL).

Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗

Admin
Single keyVerified onchainDetails

Single key: 9GpoNWNZ8ZLEh8rKKQ358bngFWHmc6nKVcQ9SzCfvRmw holds both mint and freeze authority and is a system account, not a program or SPL multisig.

Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗

Verified source
Standard SPL Token programVerified onchainDetails

Not applicable: the standard SPL Token program owns the mint; there is no custom token code.

Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗

Stellar

VEUR-GDXLSLCOPPHTWOQXLLKSVN4VN3G67WD2ENU7UMVAROEYVJLSPSEWXIZN
Upgradeable
NoVerified onchainDetails

No contract code: a classic Stellar asset.

Verified onchainhorizon.stellar.org ↗2 ↗

Pause
NoVerified onchainDetails

No asset-wide pause for a classic Stellar asset; auth_required is false.

Verified onchainhorizon.stellar.org ↗2 ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Yes, incl. clawbackVerified onchainDetails

Yes. Issuer flags: auth_revocable = true (can freeze a trustline), auth_clawback_enabled = true (can claw back balances), auth_immutable = false (flags can still change).

Verified onchainhorizon.stellar.org ↗2 ↗

Mint authority
Single key, uncappedVerified onchainDetails

The issuer mints by paying the asset; there is no cap. Issuer GDXLSLCOPPHTWOQXLLKSVN4VN3G67WD2ENU7UMVAROEYVJLSPSEWXIZN (home_domain vnx.io) has two signers, the master key and GDYKVJVWRTERUUOU6Z4ZN3LFMNOI7YGJNATNLPGF6R5YFYGMCRKXSEVA, weight 1 each, with low, medium and high thresholds all 0, so either key alone can sign any operation.

Verified onchainhorizon.stellar.org ↗

Burn
Holders; issuer by clawbackVerified onchainDetails

Holders burn by sending the asset back to the issuer; the issuer can also claw back balances (clawback enabled).

Verified onchainhorizon.stellar.org ↗2 ↗

Admin
Single key (either of two)Verified onchainDetails

Issuer GDXLSLCOPPHTWOQXLLKSVN4VN3G67WD2ENU7UMVAROEYVJLSPSEWXIZN (home_domain vnx.io) has two signers, the master key and GDYKVJVWRTERUUOU6Z4ZN3LFMNOI7YGJNATNLPGF6R5YFYGMCRKXSEVA, weight 1 each, with low, medium and high thresholds all 0, so either key alone can sign any operation.

Verified onchainhorizon.stellar.org ↗

Verified source
No contractVerified onchainDetails

Not applicable: classic Stellar asset, no contract.

Verified onchainhorizon.stellar.org ↗

Yield, audits and risks

Yield
Audits
Not disclosedChecked

No smart-contract audit is named on the pages read; vnx.io and docs.vnx.io were blocked.

Checkedprod-global-terms.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com ↗vnx.li ↗

Compliance
Onchain freeze and seizeVerified onchainDetails

Onchain: the asset-protection role can freeze addresses and seize frozen balances; the transfer-provider hook currently approves all transfers. No current KYC terms for VEUR were found.

Verified onchaineth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗

Disclosed risks
Single keys control mint, freeze, upgradeVerified onchainDetails

On every EVM chain read, one EOA per chain (plus a second Superadmin EOA, 0xacc56ebcc391108a725f269fdd82d6cbe65b311a, on all of them) can pause VEUR, freeze addresses and seize frozen balances, and set its own minting allowance; an EOA owns the ProxyAdmin that upgrades the token. On Solana a single system account holds mint and freeze authority; on Stellar either of two keys controls the issuer, with clawback enabled. No incidents found on the pages read.

VNX said on 11 May 2026 it would stop active support for Polygon, Avalanche, Arbitrum and Concordium after 31 May 2026 (holders asked to swap by then). Exchange operations on the vnx.li platform were suspended from 30 Jun 2026.

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗mainnet.base.org ↗api.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗horizon.stellar.org ↗vnx.li ↗xrplcluster.com ↗

Links and contracts

Contracts

VEUR contract addresses (9)

Not on VNX's own pages. Found via block explorers and data aggregators.

Compiled from public issuer, regulator and explorer pages. Not advice. Confirm with the issuer before sending funds. Report a correction.