Verify and integrate GBPe

What a GBP stablecoin user should check before choosing GBPe, from public sources as of 14 Nov 2026. GBP stablecoins · Compare side by side

Issuer-statedVerified onchainThird-partyNot disclosed: nothing public says it.

Governance

From the reviewed token controls; chains nobody reviewed are not covered. Token controls

Summary

Monerium's sterling e-money tokenIssuer-statedDetails

GBPe is a pound sterling e-money token issued by Monerium hf., the Icelandic electronic money institution behind EURe, on the same smart contracts. Monerium's terms say issuing and redeeming e-money in currencies other than euros needs a separate agreement with Monerium. No GBPe product page or white paper was found.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗

Issuer and licences

Legal entity
Monerium hf. (Iceland, 550512-1060)Issuer-statedDetails

Monerium hf., Icelandic company no. 550512-1060, LEI 2549003QDNZWASSSCY31, registered 2012-05-10. ESMA's MiCA register shows the LEI name as 'Monerium ehf'.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗esma.europa.eu ↗

Jurisdiction
Iceland (EEA)Issuer-statedDetails

Iceland (EEA). Applicable law and competent court for EURe: Iceland.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗

Regulator
Central Bank of Iceland (FSA)Third-partyDetails

Financial Supervisory Authority of the Central Bank of Iceland. ESMA's MiCA register lists the Central Bank of Iceland as competent authority.

Third-partyesma.europa.eu ↗monerium.com ↗

Licences
EMI (Iceland, 2019) and VASPThird-partyDetails

Electronic money institution under Icelandic Act No. 17/2013 (Directive 2009/110/EC); also registered as a virtual asset service provider under Act No. 18/2018. The white paper gives the EMI authorisation date as 14 June 2019; ESMA's register gives 25/09/2019 and the EURe MiCA white paper notification as 09/01/2026. No licence number is published.

The issuer and ESMA give different authorisation dates (2019-06-14 vs 2019-09-25).

Third-partyesma.europa.eu ↗monerium.com ↗2 ↗

Website
monerium.comIssuer-statedDetails
FXscan licence check

Licensed · Central Bank of Iceland · Monerium hf.

Listed by the Central Bank of Iceland as an e-money institution.

Source: cb.is ↗ · Checked 31 Oct 2026

Funding and ownership

Parent
No parent companyIssuer-statedDetails

None. The EURe white paper says Monerium hf does not have a parent company.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗

Owners
GnosisVC, HOF and angel investorsIssuer-statedDetails

Monerium names GnosisVC and HOF Investment as investors, plus Davíð Helgason, Hjalmar Winbladh and Balaji Srinivasan. The white paper adds that companies related to entities running blockchains it issues on are minority shareholders. Shareholdings are not published.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗

Funding
$2M seed 2019; $4M 2021Issuer-statedDetails

US$2M seed (January 2019) led by Crowberry Capital with ConsenSys and Hof Holdings; US$4M (September 2021) led by Taavet+Sten (Taavet Hinrikus and Sten Tamkivi). No later round is published on its site.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗

Partners
Arion, LHV, State Street; Safe, BleapIssuer-statedDetails

Safeguarding: Arion bank (Iceland), LHV bank (Estonia), State Street Global Advisors (Europe). Product integrations named on its site: Safe, Bleap, Gnosis Pay, Aave and Morpho.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗

Reserves

Backing
1:1 sterling deposits or liquid assetsIssuer-statedDetails

1:1 in the same currency, held as deposits in segregated bank accounts or high-quality liquid assets, as the white paper states for every Monerium e-money token. The white paper puts GBPe issuance at about GBP 0.4 million at end-2024.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗

Allocation
Not disclosedChecked

The financial information page describes the asset mix for EURe only.

Checkedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗

Custodian
Arion, LHV, State StreetIssuer-statedDetails

Segregated accounts with Arion bank (Iceland), LHV bank (Estonia) and State Street Global Advisors (Europe).

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗

Segregation
Segregated; priority claim in insolvencyIssuer-statedDetails

Funds are held in segregated safeguarded accounts, separate from Monerium's own funds, within five business days of receipt. The white paper says holders have a priority claim on them under the Icelandic Bankruptcy Act No. 21/1991.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗

Attestation
None public; annual audited accountsIssuer-statedDetails

No public attestation: Monerium says EMIs are not required to publish one and that it is preparing regular attestations. Its annual accounts are audited and filed with the Icelandic Business Registry; the site lists e-money issued and safeguarded assets per year, latest 2024: €26,521,018.35 and €26,521,018.35. The auditor is not named.

The 2024 figures are Monerium's total e-money, not EURe alone; the year-end date is read from the row label '2024'.

As of 31 Dec 2024

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗

Proof of reserve
Not disclosedChecked

Mint and redeem

Who can
Customers with a non-euro agreementIssuer-statedDetails

Monerium customers who pass due diligence and sign an additional agreement for non-euro e-money.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗

Process
Bank in and out; GBP rail not namedIssuer-statedDetails

The terms describe issuance at par when Monerium receives funds and redemption by burn and bank payout for all its e-money; the GBP payment route is not described.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗

Speed
Not disclosedChecked
Fees
Not disclosedChecked

The terms refer to a Fee Schedule that was not found; the no-fee FAQ is on the EURe page only.

Checkedmonerium.com ↗

Minimums
Not disclosedChecked
Any holder at par
At par any time, customers onlyIssuer-statedDetails

Holders of Monerium e-money tokens can redeem at par at any time after becoming a Monerium customer, subject to its terms and any regulatory or court restriction.

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗

FXscan's how-to-get summary

How to get GBPe

We have not compiled mint and redeem details for GBPe yet. Send details with a source →

Token controls

ChainAdminUpgradeablePauseFreezeMint
ArbitrumMultisig 3-of-6Verified onchainYesVerified onchainNoVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyAllowanceVerified onchain
BaseMultisig 3-of-6Verified onchainYesVerified onchainNoVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyAllowanceVerified onchain
EthereumMultisig 3-of-6Verified onchainYesVerified onchainNoVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyAllowanceVerified onchain
GnosisUnknownVerified onchainYesVerified onchainUnknownUnknownVerified onchainUnknownVerified onchain
PolygonMultisig 3-of-6Verified onchainYesVerified onchainNoVerified onchainYesVerified onchainSingle keyAllowanceVerified onchain

Not reviewed yet: Linea.

Contracts and full control facts

Arbitrum

0x2D80dBf04D0802abD7A342DaFA5d7cB42bfbb52f
Upgradeable
Yes, by 3-of-6 SafeVerified onchainDetails

Yes. UUPS ERC1967 proxy to implementation Token 0xddfe2c5f94909420cf55827fffa09a7ff9b2ab77 (shared with EURe on Arbitrum). _authorizeUpgrade is onlyOwner; owner() is Safe 0xd4d43a82708261f2995f7ba65319d8664b992a96 (3-of-6).

Verified onchainarb1.arbitrum.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Pause
No pause functionVerified onchainDetails

No pause function in the verified token source (Token.sol). Every transfer asks the validator contract 0xbf932187c26222b79943cbb93f78159fef2743c6; the owner can replace it (setValidator), and the validator's owner can upgrade it, which could stop transfers without a pause switch.

Verified onchainarb1.arbitrum.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Yes, sender blacklist via validatorVerified onchainDetails

Yes. Transfers call validator 0xbf932187c26222b79943cbb93f78159fef2743c6 (BlacklistValidatorUpgradeable, verified): ban()/unban() by its ADMIN_ROLE accounts; a banned address cannot send, but can still receive. Validator owner: Safe 0xd4d43a82708261f2995f7ba65319d8664b992a96 (3-of-6), the same validator as EURe on Arbitrum; validator ADMIN_ROLE holders were not determined. Ban history on Arbitrum was not read. recover() lets SYSTEM_ROLE move a holder's whole balance to another address, but only with that holder's signature; no seize or wipe without it.

Verified onchainarb1.arbitrum.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Mint authority
Single key, within allowanceVerified onchainDetails

mint() requires SYSTEM_ROLE and spends the caller's mint allowance; there is no other cap. SYSTEM_ROLE holder found: EOA 0x882145b1f9764372125861727d7be616c84010ef (allowance 499,988 GBPe on 2026-11-14). ADMIN_ROLE accounts can set any system account's allowance (setMintAllowance) up to the owner's maximum, getMaxMintAllowance() = 3,000,000 GBPe. ADMIN_ROLE: EOA 0xeba38f2deb4f14db1a4801d32c10e9554557518a. The owner (Safe 0xd4d43a82708261f2995f7ba65319d8664b992a96 (3-of-6)) grants and revokes both roles. AccessControl here is not enumerable and this chain's event history could not be read (explorer behind a bot check; RPC log range limited), so holders were confirmed with hasRole for the 32 Monerium addresses seen in the Ethereum and Gnosis role events; other holders cannot be ruled out.

Verified onchainarb1.arbitrum.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Burn
System role, holder signatureVerified onchainDetails

burn(from, amount, …, signature) requires SYSTEM_ROLE and a valid signature from the holder (ECDSA or ERC-1271) over a fixed message; redemption burns this way.

Verified onchainarb1.arbitrum.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Admin
3-of-6 Safe; minting by single keysVerified onchainDetails

Owner Safe 0xd4d43a82708261f2995f7ba65319d8664b992a96 (3-of-6): upgrades, setValidator, SYSTEM/ADMIN role grants, max mint allowance. Mint allowances are set by ADMIN_ROLE accounts (EOAs, plus no Safe) and minting is done by system EOA 0x882145b1f9764372125861727d7be616c84010ef.

Verified onchainarb1.arbitrum.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Verified source
YesVerified onchainDetails

Yes: proxy (Sourcify match, listed under the name ERC1155CollectionProxy) and implementation Token (Sourcify exact match, Solidity 0.8.20).

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Base

0xc4759Ed641DA77CbDc9fA2f37E9260a29BF7cC52
Upgradeable
Yes, by 3-of-6 SafeVerified onchainDetails

Yes. UUPS ERC1967Proxy to implementation Token 0x07a39b8cdb8b2227651023f54e85401c4bd8f08d. _authorizeUpgrade is onlyOwner; owner() is Safe 0x8001ea269cb9715bf7acff89c664ffc134a519ec (3-of-6).

Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Pause
No pause functionVerified onchainDetails

No pause function in the verified token source (Token.sol). Every transfer asks the validator contract 0xb84a88f60c9d67e2c83846f2efecbc00f534fc51; the owner can replace it (setValidator), and the validator's owner can upgrade it, which could stop transfers without a pause switch.

Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Yes, sender blacklist via validatorVerified onchainDetails

Yes. Transfers call validator 0xb84a88f60c9d67e2c83846f2efecbc00f534fc51 (BlacklistValidatorUpgradeable, verified): ban()/unban() by its ADMIN_ROLE accounts; a banned address cannot send, but can still receive. Validator owner: EOA 0xd7648cbcece018829ea7b0e561605e7fd3db8af6 (a single key, which can also upgrade the validator); validator ADMIN_ROLE holders were not determined. Ban history on Base was not read. recover() lets SYSTEM_ROLE move a holder's whole balance to another address, but only with that holder's signature; no seize or wipe without it.

Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Mint authority
Single key, within allowanceVerified onchainDetails

mint() requires SYSTEM_ROLE and spends the caller's mint allowance; there is no other cap. SYSTEM_ROLE holder found: EOA 0x882145b1f9764372125861727d7be616c84010ef (allowance 499,566.05 GBPe on 2026-11-14). ADMIN_ROLE accounts can set any system account's allowance (setMintAllowance) up to the owner's maximum, getMaxMintAllowance() = 3,000,000 GBPe. ADMIN_ROLE: EOAs 0x63bd39ac130879203766663d0408da306c553263, 0xcb124a864489382d072aaa19f715c4cd836e57be, 0x02c4d14022f7779e5f1ed4224a4bde3e166e35f0 and 0x431d580632d95804ccb74b4f2dfa22ef58ecf027. The owner (Safe 0x8001ea269cb9715bf7acff89c664ffc134a519ec (3-of-6)) grants and revokes both roles. AccessControl here is not enumerable and this chain's event history could not be read (explorer behind a bot check; RPC log range limited), so holders were confirmed with hasRole for the 32 Monerium addresses seen in the Ethereum and Gnosis role events; other holders cannot be ruled out.

Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Burn
System role, holder signatureVerified onchainDetails

burn(from, amount, …, signature) requires SYSTEM_ROLE and a valid signature from the holder (ECDSA or ERC-1271) over a fixed message; redemption burns this way.

Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Admin
3-of-6 Safe; minting by single keysVerified onchainDetails

Owner Safe 0x8001ea269cb9715bf7acff89c664ffc134a519ec (3-of-6): upgrades, setValidator, SYSTEM/ADMIN role grants, max mint allowance. Mint allowances are set by ADMIN_ROLE accounts (EOAs, plus no Safe) and minting is done by system EOA 0x882145b1f9764372125861727d7be616c84010ef.

Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Verified source
YesVerified onchainDetails

Yes: proxy (Sourcify match) and implementation Token (Sourcify exact match, Solidity 0.8.20).

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Ethereum

0x7ba92741Bf2A568abC6f1D3413c58c6e0244F8fD
Upgradeable
Yes, by 3-of-6 SafeVerified onchainDetails

Yes. This address is the v1 GBP TokenFrontend (not a proxy); its owner can point it at a new controller (setController). getController() is 0x78a20b7af85156b4389a349aa4c96efc2e509768, a UUPS ERC1967Proxy to EthereumControllerTokenV2_1_0 0x763701a6ce1d8e4dE678D2C8d9f2BcA3FD089C35, whose _authorizeUpgrade is onlyOwner. Both owners are Safe 0x5591a6495d726c7efafb9a9dad32695d137b4d9f (3-of-6).

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗

Pause
No pause functionVerified onchainDetails

No pause function in the controller source (Token.sol, EthereumControllerToken). The owner can replace the validator 0x03b15b0fd8dc5fd25d52fe3cf5f82135d80c641b (shared with EURe on Ethereum), which could stop transfers.

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Yes; deployer EOA can also burnVerified onchainDetails

Yes. Transfers call validator 0x03b15b0fd8dc5fd25d52fe3cf5f82135d80c641b: ban()/unban() by its ADMIN_ROLE holder, Safe 0x46a4b8e08409e6285dd321993273dd68b9a549a3 (threshold 1 of 6); banned senders are blocked. No Ban events on Ethereum. In addition, EthereumControllerTokenV2_1_0 has burnWithoutSignature(from, amount), callable only by the deployer EOA 0x798728D5410aB4FB49d2C277A49baC5048aB43ca, which can burn any holder's GBPe on Ethereum without consent.

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗

Mint authority
Single key, within allowanceVerified onchainDetails

mint() on controller 0x78a20b7af85156b4389a349aa4c96efc2e509768 requires SYSTEM_ROLE and a mint allowance. SYSTEM_ROLE holder found: EOA 0x882145b1f9764372125861727d7be616c84010ef (allowance 500,000 GBPe on 2026-11-14). ADMIN_ROLE holder found: Safe 0x46a4b8e08409e6285dd321993273dd68b9a549a3 (1 of 6). Maximum allowance 3,000,000 GBPe. totalSupply() is 0 on Ethereum. AccessControl here is not enumerable and this chain's event history could not be read (explorer behind a bot check; RPC log range limited), so holders were confirmed with hasRole for the 32 Monerium addresses seen in the Ethereum and Gnosis role events; other holders cannot be ruled out.

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗

Burn
System role; deployer EOA without signatureVerified onchainDetails

burn() by SYSTEM_ROLE with the holder's signature; burnWithoutSignature() by deployer EOA 0x798728D5410aB4FB49d2C277A49baC5048aB43ca with no signature.

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗

Admin
3-of-6 Safe; several single keysVerified onchainDetails

Owner Safe 0x5591a6495d726c7efafb9a9dad32695d137b4d9f (3-of-6) of frontend and controller. Single keys: system EOA 0x882145b1f9764372125861727d7be616c84010ef (mint), the 1-of-6 Safe 0x46a4b8e08409e6285dd321993273dd68b9a549a3 (allowances, bans) and deployer EOA 0x798728D5410aB4FB49d2C277A49baC5048aB43ca (burn without signature).

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗

Verified source
YesVerified onchainDetails

Yes: frontend GBP (Sourcify match, Solidity 0.4.24), controller proxy ERC1967Proxy and implementation EthereumControllerTokenV2_1_0 (Blockscout verified 2024-12-17).

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗

Gnosis

0x8E34bfEC4f6Eb781f9743D9b4af99CD23F9b7053
Upgradeable
Yes; upgrade rule not confirmedVerified onchainDetails

Yes, an EIP-1967 proxy: implementation slot 0x2ba8cbba75c70fa47107e836bed8c3b3b41bf7be, after six Upgraded events (blocks 35656508 to 35735492). owner() is Safe 0x8001ea269cb9715bf7acff89c664ffc134a519ec (3-of-6). The implementation source could not be checked, so who may upgrade is not confirmed from source.

Verified onchainrpc.gnosischain.com ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Pause
Not disclosedChecked

Implementation source not on Sourcify and Gnosisscan was not reachable, so the absence of a pause function could not be confirmed.

Checkedrpc.gnosischain.com ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Validator with 823 bans; use unconfirmedVerified onchainDetails

validator() returns 0xfe74a522768547be33a3ad40b999381d57f238a0, the BlacklistValidatorUpgradeable shared with EURe on Gnosis (823 addresses banned on 2026-11-14). How the token uses it could not be confirmed from source.

Verified onchainrpc.gnosischain.com ↗sourcify.dev ↗

Mint authority
Single-key system account; rule unconfirmedVerified onchainDetails

From events and reads: SYSTEM_ROLE holder EOA 0x882145b1f9764372125861727d7be616c84010ef with getMintAllowance 660,017.73 GBPe and getMaxMintAllowance 3,000,000 GBPe; ADMIN_ROLE: EOAs 0x982d4bfda9dd538c0abd4ded6f27fc170f048aa9, 0xeb063c49b09221c3567ce3924ddf727f4ec3d9b2, 0x63bd39ac130879203766663d0408da306c553263, 0xcb124a864489382d072aaa19f715c4cd836e57be, 0x02c4d14022f7779e5f1ed4224a4bde3e166e35f0, 0x613121de604b432751e31e5bc92bc070a1e8fd07, 0x431d580632d95804ccb74b4f2dfa22ef58ecf027 and 0xeba38f2deb4f14db1a4801d32c10e9554557518a and the 1-of-6 Safe 0x2086c05567e60116b54384b790ba1e20090ca94f. The mint rule itself could not be read from verified source.

Verified onchainrpc.gnosischain.com ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Burn
Not disclosedChecked

Implementation source not verifiable from this session.

Checkedrpc.gnosischain.com ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Admin
3-of-6 Safe ownerVerified onchainDetails

owner() is Safe 0x8001ea269cb9715bf7acff89c664ffc134a519ec (3-of-6); system and admin accounts are EOAs and a 1-of-6 Safe.

Verified onchainrpc.gnosischain.com ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Verified source
Not disclosedChecked

Neither proxy nor implementation is on Sourcify; Gnosisscan (where gnosis.blockscout.com redirects) was not reachable.

Checkedrpc.gnosischain.com ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Polygon

0x646BEea7a02FdAdA34c8e118949fE32350aB2206
Upgradeable
Yes, by 3-of-6 SafeVerified onchainDetails

Yes. UUPS ERC1967 proxy (EIP-1967 implementation slot) to implementation PolygonControllerToken 0x0a0b9dce9c2d20067df8bfd245d1b7701cfb6438. _authorizeUpgrade is onlyOwner; owner() is Safe 0x8001ea269cb9715bf7acff89c664ffc134a519ec (3-of-6). getFrontend() returns 0x75792CBDb361d80ba89271a079EfeE62c29FA324, the v1 GBP frontend that forwards to this contract.

Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Pause
No pause functionVerified onchainDetails

No pause function in the verified token source (Token.sol, PolygonControllerToken). Every transfer asks the validator contract 0x1a5c1c937b9b594b1f02077829678fbe169ddb5f; the owner can replace it (setValidator), and the validator's owner can upgrade it, which could stop transfers without a pause switch.

Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Freeze / blacklist
Yes, sender blacklist via validatorVerified onchainDetails

Yes. Transfers call validator 0x1a5c1c937b9b594b1f02077829678fbe169ddb5f (BlacklistValidatorUpgradeable, verified): ban()/unban() by its ADMIN_ROLE accounts; a banned address cannot send, but can still receive. Validator owner: Safe 0x8001ea269cb9715bf7acff89c664ffc134a519ec (3-of-6), the same validator as EURe on Polygon; validator ADMIN_ROLE holders were not determined. Ban history on Polygon was not read. recover() lets SYSTEM_ROLE move a holder's whole balance to another address, but only with that holder's signature; no seize or wipe without it.

Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Mint authority
Single key, within allowanceVerified onchainDetails

mint() requires SYSTEM_ROLE and spends the caller's mint allowance; there is no other cap. SYSTEM_ROLE holder found: EOA 0x882145b1f9764372125861727d7be616c84010ef (allowance 499,990 GBPe on 2026-11-14, set before the maximum was lowered). ADMIN_ROLE accounts can set any system account's allowance (setMintAllowance) up to the owner's maximum, getMaxMintAllowance() = 53.64 GBPe. ADMIN_ROLE: none found among the checked addresses. The owner (Safe 0x8001ea269cb9715bf7acff89c664ffc134a519ec (3-of-6)) grants and revokes both roles. AccessControl here is not enumerable and this chain's event history could not be read (explorer behind a bot check; RPC log range limited), so holders were confirmed with hasRole for the 32 Monerium addresses seen in the Ethereum and Gnosis role events; other holders cannot be ruled out.

Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Burn
System role, holder signatureVerified onchainDetails

burn(from, amount, …, signature) requires SYSTEM_ROLE and a valid signature from the holder (ECDSA or ERC-1271) over a fixed message; redemption burns this way.

Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Admin
3-of-6 Safe; minting by single keysVerified onchainDetails

Owner Safe 0x8001ea269cb9715bf7acff89c664ffc134a519ec (3-of-6): upgrades, setValidator, SYSTEM/ADMIN role grants, max mint allowance. Mint allowances are set by ADMIN_ROLE accounts (EOAs, plus no Safe) and minting is done by system EOA 0x882145b1f9764372125861727d7be616c84010ef.

Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Verified source
Implementation yes; proxy not checkedVerified onchainDetails

Implementation PolygonControllerToken is verified (Sourcify exact match, Solidity 0.8.20). The proxy is not on Sourcify, and Polygonscan and Polygon Blockscout were not reachable.

Verified onchainsourcify.dev ↗2 ↗

Yield, audits and risks

Yield
NoIssuer-statedDetails

No. Monerium does not pay interest or other returns on its e-money tokens (MiCA Art. 50).

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗

Audits
Ackee 2023, 2024Issuer-statedDetails

Ackee Blockchain, Monerium smart contracts (22 Aug 2023): 18 findings, none critical or high; owner multisig threshold raised from 2-of-6 to 3-of-6. Ackee Blockchain, Monerium V2 contracts (13 Jun 2024): 11 findings incl. 2 high, reported mitigated.

The audits are listed in the EURe white paper. GBPe on Base, Arbitrum and Polygon runs the same verified Token.sol source as EURe (compared on Sourcify).

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗

Compliance
KYC/CDD; onchain sender blacklistIssuer-statedDetails

Customers pass customer due diligence (KYC/KYB) before issuance or redemption; redemptions can be halted, checked further or declined under AML and sanctions rules. Monerium may blacklist addresses and freeze e-money sent to or from them. Onchain, a validator contract blocks banned senders; the Gnosis validator 0xfe74a522768547be33a3ad40b999381d57f238a0, shared by EURe and GBPe, had 823 addresses banned (844 Ban, 21 Unban events).

Issuer-statedmonerium.com ↗2 ↗rpc.gnosischain.com ↗

Disclosed risks
Single-key mint; deployer EOA can burnVerified onchainDetails

Minting is done by one system EOA (0x882145b1f9764372125861727d7be616c84010ef) within allowances that single-key ADMIN_ROLE accounts can raise to the owner's maximum (3,000,000 GBPe on Ethereum, Gnosis, Base and Arbitrum). On Ethereum the controller still runs EthereumControllerTokenV2_1_0, whose burnWithoutSignature lets deployer EOA 0x798728D5410aB4FB49d2C277A49baC5048aB43ca burn any holder's balance (supply there is 0). On Base the validator is owned by EOA 0xd7648cbcece018829ea7b0e561605e7fd3db8af6. No incidents found.

Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗mainnet.base.org ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗

Links and contracts

Compiled from public issuer, regulator and explorer pages. Not advice. Confirm with the issuer before sending funds. Report a correction.