Verify and integrate CHFAU
What a CHF stablecoin user should check before choosing CHFAU, from public sources as of 14 Nov 2026. CHF stablecoins · Compare side by side
Issuer-statedVerified onchainThird-partyNot disclosed: nothing public says it.
Governance
A single key holds admin rights · all 6 chainsVerified onchain
Arc, Base, Ethereum, Polygon, Solana, Tempo
rpc.mainnet.arc.io ↗mainnet.base.org ↗ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗polygon.drpc.org ↗api.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗rpc.tempo.xyz ↗A single key can upgrade the contract · 5 of 6 chainsVerified onchain
A single key can mint · 5 of 6 chainsVerified onchain
No mint cap in the contract · 2 of 6 chainsVerified onchain
From the reviewed token controls; chains nobody reviewed are not covered. Token controls
Summary
AllUnity's MiCAR Swiss franc e-money tokenIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
CHFAU is a Swiss franc e-money token issued since February 2026 by AllUnity GmbH, a BaFin-licensed e-money institution in Frankfurt founded by DWS, Galaxy and Flow Traders. It is backed 1:1 by segregated CHF reserves and redeemable at par under MiCAR. Minting is for onboarded institutional and professional clients; it targets cross-border payments and onchain settlement in CHF.
Issuer-statedallunity.com ↗2 ↗framerusercontent.com ↗
Issuer and licences
- Legal entity
AllUnity GmbH, HRB 134001Issuer-statedDetailsDetails
AllUnity GmbH (limited liability company), Commercial Register Frankfurt am Main HRB 134001, LEI 3912007G8L8CD3HFIV26, registered 2024-02-27.
Managing directors per the imprint and white papers: Alexander Höptner (CEO) and Simon Seiter (CFO).
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗allunity.com ↗
- Jurisdiction
Germany (Frankfurt am Main)Issuer-statedDetailsDetails
Germany (Sandweg 94, 60316 Frankfurt am Main); EURAU/CHFAU terms governed by German law, courts of Frankfurt am Main.
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗allunity.com ↗
- Regulator
BaFinIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), named in the white papers as authorisation authority (A.26).
The BaFin company database page listed in lib/issuer-links.json (portal.mvp.bafin.de) and the ESMA register were not reachable from this session, so the register entry was not read.
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗allunity.com ↗
- Licences
BaFin e-money institution; MiCAR EMT issuerIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
Licensed e-money institution (E-Geld-Institut) under Section 11 of the German Payment Services Supervision Act (ZAG) and Article 48(1) MiCAR; issues EURAU, CHFAU, SEKAU and USDAU as e-money tokens with published MiCAR white papers. EURAU offer to the public started 2025-07-22; CHFAU 2026-02-26.
No licence number is printed in the white papers; lib/licence-tags.json carries BaFin-ID 10163815 from the BaFin register, which could not be opened here.
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗allunity.com ↗
- Website
allunity.com/chfauIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
Issuer-statedallunity.com ↗
FXscan licence check
Licensed · BaFin (Germany) · BaFin-ID 10163815 · AllUnity GmbH
BaFin e-money licence and MiCA EMT authorisation since 1 Jul 2025.
Source: portal.mvp.bafin.de ↗ · Checked 31 Oct 2026
Funding and ownership
- Parent
Global Tokenization Holdings Ltd.Issuer-statedDetailsDetails
Global Tokenization Holdings Ltd., described as the holding company for AllUnity (white paper A.15).
Field A.12 'Parent company' in the same white papers reads 'Not applicable. Please refer to LEI'; A.15 names the parent.
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗
- Owners
DWS, Galaxy, Flow Traders (indirect)Issuer-statedDetailsDetails
Three major investors, holding indirectly through the parent: DWS Group GmbH & Co. KGaA (Deutsche Bank subsidiary), Galaxy Digital Holdings Ltd. and Flow Traders Ltd. Stake sizes not published.
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗allunity.com ↗2 ↗
- Funding
Shareholder-funded; amounts not publishedIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
Funded by the three shareholders through the parent; at business start (22 July 2025) AllUnity held amounts 'significantly exceeding' the EUR 25,000 GmbH capital and EUR 350,000 regulatory initial capital. No round sizes or valuations published.
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗
- Partners
DWS, Flow Traders, Galaxy; Deloitte reportsIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
Consortium partners DWS, Flow Traders and Galaxy. White papers: Flow Traders Investment Ltd. and Galaxy Trading Asia Ltd. may act as Verified Institutions and DWS Investment GmbH may assist with reserve management. Deloitte reports on the reserves (Trust Center). Site news (Sept-Nov 2026): Flowdesk-powered CHFAU liquidity pools on Base and Solana; Tereina (SAP-backed) for multi-currency stablecoin payments. Reserve banks not named.
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗allunity.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗
Reserves
- Backing
1:1 CHF cash and CHF HQLAsIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
1:1 by CHF: funds received for issuance are held in separate accounts at EU credit institutions (Directive 2013/36/EU) as CHF cash or CHF-denominated highly liquid low-risk financial instruments (HQLAs).
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗allunity.com ↗
- Allocation
Not disclosedCheckedChecked
No split between cash and HQLAs is published on the pages read. The Trust Center and coin page reserve counters render client-side and read 0 in the served HTML; the Deloitte report PDFs (dataexchangesuite.deloitte.de) were not reachable from this session.
- Custodian
Unnamed EU banks (multi-bank)Issuer-statedDetailsDetails
Multiple EU banks (CRR credit institutions); the banks are not named.
Issuer-statedallunity.com ↗framerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗
- Segregation
Segregated, insolvency-remote accountsIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
Yes. Reserves sit in separate accounts apart from AllUnity's own funds; under MiCAR and section 28 of the German Crypto Markets Supervisory Act (KMAG) they do not fall into AllUnity's insolvency estate, and only EMT holders' redemption claims may be enforced against them.
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗allunity.com ↗
- Attestation
Deloitte monthly; latest listed Sept 2026Issuer-statedDetailsDetails
Deloitte 'Independent Auditor Report' on the AllUnity reserve report, listed monthly on the Trust Center: July, August and September 2026 (latest listed: Sept 2026).
The report PDFs are hosted on dataexchangesuite.deloitte.de, which this session could not reach, so the firm's opinion, scope (per coin or all coins), period and figures were not read.
Issuer-statedallunity.com ↗
- Proof of reserve
Not disclosedCheckedChecked
No onchain proof-of-reserve feed is named on the pages read.
Checkedallunity.com ↗2 ↗
Mint and redeem
- Who can
Onboarded institutions; any holder can redeemIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
Primary mint and redeem only for Verified Institutions: institutional and professional clients after KYB/AML onboarding (site is B2B only). Any other holder can redeem directly after KYC under the Redemption Policy.
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗allunity.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗
- Process
vIBAN deposit mints; send-back burnsIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
Mapping-based, no API: after KYB the client whitelists its IBAN and wallet; AllUnity assigns a virtual IBAN per wallet. Fiat sent to the vIBAN is minted 1:1 to the mapped wallet. Redemption: send tokens to AllUnity's redemption address on that chain; AllUnity burns them and wires fiat to the registered bank account. Same-currency cross-chain moves are burn-and-mint by AllUnity.
Issuer-statedallunity.com ↗2 ↗framerusercontent.com ↗
- Speed
Mint <5 min; redeem ≤5 business daysIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
Mint: 'straight-through processing in under 5 minutes' once funds arrive. Redemption by holders who are not clients: AllUnity aims to finish within five business days after full documentation.
Issuer-statedallunity.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗framerusercontent.com ↗
- Fees
No mint/redeem fees; holder pays gasIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
No minting, redemption or onboarding fees (partners page); the Redemption Policy says no administrative, processing or redemption fees, the holder pays network gas. The Terms of Service refer clients to a separate, unpublished fee schedule.
White papers (D.4) allow liquidity fees on redemption only under an activated Recovery Plan.
Issuer-statedallunity.com ↗framerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗
- Minimums
Not disclosedCheckedChecked
No minimum amount published. The Terms of Service set client-specific issuance limits based on verified source of funds, shown on the platform.
- Any holder at par
Yes, at par (MiCAR Art. 49)Issuer-statedDetailsDetails
Yes. Under Article 49 MiCAR every holder has a statutory claim against AllUnity to redeem at any time at par, subject to the Redemption Policy (KYC, source of funds, sanctions checks, payout to an account in the holder's name, EEA IBAN or AML-officer approval).
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗allunity.com ↗
FXscan's how-to-get summary
How to get CHFAU
- Who can mint
- Businesses only
- Mint
- Onboarded institutional/corporate clients mint CHFAU 1:1 via the AllUnity Business Mint Account by sending CHF to AllUnity's account.
- Redeem
- Institutional clients redeem CHFAU 1:1 for CHF via the same Business Mint Account, sent back to their bank account.
- Payment rails
- Not confirmed
Compiled 23 Sep 2026 from public issuer information (allunity.com). Not advice. Confirm with the issuer before sending funds. Report a correction.
Token controls
| Chain | Admin | Upgradeable | Pause | Freeze | Mint |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arc | Single keyVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | Single keyVerified onchain |
| Base | Single keyVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | Single keyVerified onchain |
| Ethereum | Single keyVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | Single keyUncappedVerified onchain |
| Polygon | Single keyVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | Single keyVerified onchain |
| Solana | Single keyVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | UnknownVerified onchain |
| Tempo | Single keyVerified onchain | NoVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | YesVerified onchain | Single keyUncappedVerified onchain |
Contracts and full control facts
Arc
0xc6df1b92a6ae61a27059c41e541a91ce8dcb1605- Upgradeable
Yes; single-key UUPS adminVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. UUPS proxy (EIP-1967): implementation slot = 0xa5a15c2f23daf75563355f9397ab51ca320ce7e5 (AllUnity, version() = 1.0.0); admin and beacon slots are empty. _authorizeUpgrade is restricted to DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, held by EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f; no timelock.
This chain's implementation (0xa5a15c2f23daf75563355f9397ab51ca320ce7e5) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainrpc.mainnet.arc.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗
- Pause
Yes; admin EOAVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. pause()/unpause() restricted to PAUSER_ROLE, held by EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f (the same key as the admin); paused() = false.
This chain's implementation (0xa5a15c2f23daf75563355f9397ab51ca320ce7e5) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainrpc.mainnet.arc.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗
- Freeze / blacklist
Yes; blacklist and forced burnVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. Transfers to or from an address with BLACKLISTED_ROLE in the shared BlacklistManagement contract 0xeafba0d16d6a0ff3c6c5d0a46ca7b8fbff21a9d3 (UUPS proxy, same address on every EVM chain and for every AllUnity token) revert. BLACKLISTER_ROLE: EOA 0x72b604de032cb733e18d06d91ccc87bb4a9df637; its DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (and upgrade right): EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f. Seizure: burnFromBlacklistedAddress lets BLACKLISTED_BURNER_ROLE (EOA 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7) burn any blacklisted balance without allowance.
This chain's implementation (0xa5a15c2f23daf75563355f9397ab51ca320ce7e5) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainrpc.mainnet.arc.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗
- Mint authority
Single key; cap unconfirmedVerified onchainDetailsDetails
mint(to, amount) restricted to MINTER_ROLE, held by EOA 0xd443f0460c39194faaa06bcd018422fcc70178dd. No cap in the verified 1.0.0 code; not confirmed for this implementation.
This chain's implementation (0xa5a15c2f23daf75563355f9397ab51ca320ce7e5) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainrpc.mainnet.arc.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗
- Burn
Burner EOA; forced burn if blacklistedVerified onchainDetailsDetails
burnFrom(from, amount) by BURNER_ROLE (EOA 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7) spends the holder's allowance; burnFromBlacklistedAddress by BLACKLISTED_BURNER_ROLE (same EOA) needs none. Holders have no self-burn function; redemption is a transfer to AllUnity.
This chain's implementation (0xa5a15c2f23daf75563355f9397ab51ca320ce7e5) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainrpc.mainnet.arc.io ↗sourcify.dev ↗
- Admin
Single key (EOA)Verified onchainDetailsDetails
Single keys (EOAs): admin + pauser 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f; minter 0xd443f0460c39194faaa06bcd018422fcc70178dd; burner + blacklisted burner 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7; blacklister 0x72b604de032cb733e18d06d91ccc87bb4a9df637. Deployer 0xc619bfc77c52d36bf10e1429a146a7d435504f3c (EOA) holds none of these roles now.
eth_getCode returns 0x for every role holder: plain externally owned accounts. Whether a key is held in an MPC or HSM setup off chain cannot be seen onchain. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainrpc.mainnet.arc.io ↗
- Verified source
Not disclosedCheckedChecked
Implementation not verified on Sourcify; the chain's explorers (Etherscan-family, Blockscout) were not reachable from this session and Sourcify has no match. Same function selectors as the verified 1.0.0 code, but the bytecode differs from the verified Ethereum implementation, so this is not counted as verified.
Checkedsourcify.dev ↗
Base
0xBD4DfC058eb95b8De5ceAF39966A1a70F5556F78- Upgradeable
Yes; single-key UUPS adminVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. UUPS proxy (EIP-1967): implementation slot = 0x0957a5b68b614f22b2dd8bd9d6879858beaaa6a0 (AllUnity, version() = 1.1.0); admin and beacon slots are empty. _authorizeUpgrade is restricted to DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, held by EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f; no timelock.
This chain's implementation (0x0957a5b68b614f22b2dd8bd9d6879858beaaa6a0) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗
- Pause
Yes; admin EOAVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. pause()/unpause() restricted to PAUSER_ROLE, held by EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f (the same key as the admin); paused() = false.
This chain's implementation (0x0957a5b68b614f22b2dd8bd9d6879858beaaa6a0) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗
- Freeze / blacklist
Yes; blacklist and forced burnVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. Transfers to or from an address with BLACKLISTED_ROLE in the shared BlacklistManagement contract 0xeafba0d16d6a0ff3c6c5d0a46ca7b8fbff21a9d3 (UUPS proxy, same address on every EVM chain and for every AllUnity token) revert. BLACKLISTER_ROLE: EOA 0x72b604de032cb733e18d06d91ccc87bb4a9df637; its DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (and upgrade right): EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f. Seizure: burnFromBlacklistedAddress lets BLACKLISTED_BURNER_ROLE (EOA 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7) burn any blacklisted balance without allowance.
This chain's implementation (0x0957a5b68b614f22b2dd8bd9d6879858beaaa6a0) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗
- Mint authority
Single key; cap unconfirmedVerified onchainDetailsDetails
mint(to, amount) restricted to MINTER_ROLE, held by EOA 0xd443f0460c39194faaa06bcd018422fcc70178dd. No cap in the verified 1.0.0 code; not confirmed for this implementation.
This chain's implementation (0x0957a5b68b614f22b2dd8bd9d6879858beaaa6a0) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗
- Burn
Burner EOA; forced burn if blacklistedVerified onchainDetailsDetails
burnFrom(from, amount) by BURNER_ROLE (EOA 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7) spends the holder's allowance; burnFromBlacklistedAddress by BLACKLISTED_BURNER_ROLE (same EOA) needs none. Holders have no self-burn function; redemption is a transfer to AllUnity.
This chain's implementation (0x0957a5b68b614f22b2dd8bd9d6879858beaaa6a0) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗2 ↗
- Admin
Single key (EOA)Verified onchainDetailsDetails
Single keys (EOAs): admin + pauser 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f; minter 0xd443f0460c39194faaa06bcd018422fcc70178dd; burner + blacklisted burner 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7; blacklister 0x72b604de032cb733e18d06d91ccc87bb4a9df637. Deployer 0xc619bfc77c52d36bf10e1429a146a7d435504f3c (EOA) holds none of these roles now.
eth_getCode returns 0x for every role holder: plain externally owned accounts. Whether a key is held in an MPC or HSM setup off chain cannot be seen onchain. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainmainnet.base.org ↗
- Verified source
Not disclosedCheckedChecked
Version 1.1.0 implementation, not verified on Sourcify; the chain's explorers (Etherscan-family, Blockscout) were not reachable from this session and Sourcify has no match. Its dispatcher has every function of the verified 1.0.0 code plus EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization, receiveWithAuthorization, cancelAuthorization and authorizationState (selectors matched) and six unidentified selectors.
Checkedsourcify.dev ↗2 ↗
Ethereum
0xbd4dfc058eb95b8de5ceaf39966a1a70f5556f78- Upgradeable
Yes; single-key UUPS adminVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. UUPS proxy (EIP-1967): implementation slot = 0x5cad3aaaef687009665d15fed23ded57862ee003 (AllUnity, version() = 1.0.0); admin and beacon slots are empty. _authorizeUpgrade is restricted to DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, held by EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f; no timelock. One Upgraded event, at deployment (2026-01-26, tx 0x322b75e2b7...); no RoleRevoked events; all roles granted in the deployment transaction.
Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗4 ↗
- Pause
Yes; admin EOAVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. pause()/unpause() restricted to PAUSER_ROLE, held by EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f (the same key as the admin); paused() = false. No Paused event emitted on Ethereum.
Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗4 ↗
- Freeze / blacklist
Yes; blacklist and forced burnVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. Transfers to or from an address with BLACKLISTED_ROLE in the shared BlacklistManagement contract 0xeafba0d16d6a0ff3c6c5d0a46ca7b8fbff21a9d3 (UUPS proxy, same address on every EVM chain and for every AllUnity token) revert. BLACKLISTER_ROLE: EOA 0x72b604de032cb733e18d06d91ccc87bb4a9df637; its DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (and upgrade right): EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f. Seizure: burnFromBlacklistedAddress lets BLACKLISTED_BURNER_ROLE (EOA 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7) burn any blacklisted balance without allowance. 126 addresses blacklisted on Ethereum between 2025-07-22 and 2026-10-29, none removed. No CHFAU burn from a blacklisted address found on Ethereum.
Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗4 ↗5 ↗6 ↗
- Mint authority
Single key, uncappedVerified onchainDetailsDetails
mint(to, amount) restricted to MINTER_ROLE, held by EOA 0xd443f0460c39194faaa06bcd018422fcc70178dd. No cap, allowance or rate limit in the contract.
Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗4 ↗
- Burn
Burner EOA; forced burn if blacklistedVerified onchainDetailsDetails
burnFrom(from, amount) by BURNER_ROLE (EOA 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7) spends the holder's allowance; burnFromBlacklistedAddress by BLACKLISTED_BURNER_ROLE (same EOA) needs none. Holders have no self-burn function; redemption is a transfer to AllUnity.
Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗4 ↗
- Admin
Single key (EOA)Verified onchainDetailsDetails
Single keys (EOAs): admin + pauser 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f; minter 0xd443f0460c39194faaa06bcd018422fcc70178dd; burner + blacklisted burner 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7; blacklister 0x72b604de032cb733e18d06d91ccc87bb4a9df637. Deployer 0xc619bfc77c52d36bf10e1429a146a7d435504f3c (EOA) holds none of these roles now.
eth_getCode returns 0x for every role holder: plain externally owned accounts. Whether a key is held in an MPC or HSM setup off chain cannot be seen onchain.
Verified onchainethereum-rpc.publicnode.com ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗
- Verified source
YesVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. Proxy (ERC1967Proxy) verified on Blockscout 2026-04-01; implementation AllUnity 0x5cad3aaaef687009665d15fed23ded57862ee003 verified 2026-06-11 (Solidity 0.8.22), same AllUnity.sol source as EURAU.
Verified onchaineth.blockscout.com ↗2 ↗
Polygon
0xBD4DfC058eb95b8De5ceAF39966A1a70F5556F78- Upgradeable
Yes; single-key UUPS adminVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. UUPS proxy (EIP-1967): implementation slot = 0x5cad3aaaef687009665d15fed23ded57862ee003 (AllUnity, version() = 1.0.0); admin and beacon slots are empty. _authorizeUpgrade is restricted to DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, held by EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f; no timelock.
This chain's implementation (0x5cad3aaaef687009665d15fed23ded57862ee003) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗
- Pause
Yes; admin EOAVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. pause()/unpause() restricted to PAUSER_ROLE, held by EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f (the same key as the admin); paused() = false.
This chain's implementation (0x5cad3aaaef687009665d15fed23ded57862ee003) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗
- Freeze / blacklist
Yes; blacklist and forced burnVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. Transfers to or from an address with BLACKLISTED_ROLE in the shared BlacklistManagement contract 0xeafba0d16d6a0ff3c6c5d0a46ca7b8fbff21a9d3 (UUPS proxy, same address on every EVM chain and for every AllUnity token) revert. BLACKLISTER_ROLE: EOA 0x72b604de032cb733e18d06d91ccc87bb4a9df637; its DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (and upgrade right): EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f. Seizure: burnFromBlacklistedAddress lets BLACKLISTED_BURNER_ROLE (EOA 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7) burn any blacklisted balance without allowance.
This chain's implementation (0x5cad3aaaef687009665d15fed23ded57862ee003) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗
- Mint authority
Single key; cap unconfirmedVerified onchainDetailsDetails
mint(to, amount) restricted to MINTER_ROLE, held by EOA 0xd443f0460c39194faaa06bcd018422fcc70178dd. No cap in the verified 1.0.0 code; not confirmed for this implementation.
This chain's implementation (0x5cad3aaaef687009665d15fed23ded57862ee003) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗
- Burn
Burner EOA; forced burn if blacklistedVerified onchainDetailsDetails
burnFrom(from, amount) by BURNER_ROLE (EOA 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7) spends the holder's allowance; burnFromBlacklistedAddress by BLACKLISTED_BURNER_ROLE (same EOA) needs none. Holders have no self-burn function; redemption is a transfer to AllUnity.
This chain's implementation (0x5cad3aaaef687009665d15fed23ded57862ee003) is not source-verified where this session could look, so the function behaviour described is taken from the verified AllUnity 1.0.0 source on Ethereum and matched only by function selectors; role holders and paused() are direct reads. A mint cap or other change in the unverified code cannot be ruled out. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗sourcify.dev ↗
- Admin
Single key (EOA)Verified onchainDetailsDetails
Single keys (EOAs): admin + pauser 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f; minter 0xd443f0460c39194faaa06bcd018422fcc70178dd; burner + blacklisted burner 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7; blacklister 0x72b604de032cb733e18d06d91ccc87bb4a9df637. Deployer 0xc619bfc77c52d36bf10e1429a146a7d435504f3c (EOA) holds none of these roles now.
eth_getCode returns 0x for every role holder: plain externally owned accounts. Whether a key is held in an MPC or HSM setup off chain cannot be seen onchain. Roles are not enumerable (OpenZeppelin AccessControl). hasRole was read for the Ethereum role holders and the deployer only; RoleGranted/RoleRevoked history on this chain was not scanned (public RPC getLogs range limits; the chain's explorers were not reachable), so other holders cannot be ruled out.
Verified onchainpolygon.drpc.org ↗
- Verified source
Not disclosedCheckedChecked
Implementation not verified on Sourcify; the chain's explorers (Etherscan-family, Blockscout) were not reachable from this session and Sourcify has no match. Same function selectors as the verified 1.0.0 code, but the bytecode differs from the verified Ethereum implementation at the same address, so this is not counted as verified.
Checkedsourcify.dev ↗
Solana
3GJfXJvPcjuAu6VQZmcs9pAXQau8nz3z88CCpBztgQSv- Upgradeable
Program upgradeable by single keyVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Mint: no (an SPL Token-2022 mint has no upgrade path). Controlling program Go6xKqsTwEWCsnzpW3ZLj9PYnPnZypFdqambKzGBP9J5: yes, upgradeable; upgrade authority DVTG4gHAAod4SVz69Li49tJ47myXtnixCVo6Ucn2N262 is a system account (single key).
Authority APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP is a 4,817-byte data account owned by program Go6xKqsTwEWCsnzpW3ZLj9PYnPnZypFdqambKzGBP9J5, i.e. program-controlled; the program's role lists were not decoded (no published account layout). The program is upgradeable (BPF Upgradeable Loader) and its upgrade authority DVTG4gHAAod4SVz69Li49tJ47myXtnixCVo6Ucn2N262 is a plain system account, so one key can replace the program that holds every mint authority. Softstack's Solana audit (23 Feb 2026) describes admin, minter, burner and freezer role lists in the program; it does not name the program address, so the link is not confirmed onchain.
Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗2 ↗
- Pause
Yes; program-controlledVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. Token-2022 pausableConfig extension, authority APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP (program-controlled); paused = false.
Authority APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP is a 4,817-byte data account owned by program Go6xKqsTwEWCsnzpW3ZLj9PYnPnZypFdqambKzGBP9J5, i.e. program-controlled; the program's role lists were not decoded (no published account layout). The program is upgradeable (BPF Upgradeable Loader) and its upgrade authority DVTG4gHAAod4SVz69Li49tJ47myXtnixCVo6Ucn2N262 is a plain system account, so one key can replace the program that holds every mint authority. Softstack's Solana audit (23 Feb 2026) describes admin, minter, burner and freezer role lists in the program; it does not name the program address, so the link is not confirmed onchain.
Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗2 ↗
- Freeze / blacklist
Freeze plus permanent delegateVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. freezeAuthority = APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP (program-controlled). permanentDelegate = APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP: it can transfer or burn any holder's balance. transferHook authority is APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP with no hook program set.
Authority APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP is a 4,817-byte data account owned by program Go6xKqsTwEWCsnzpW3ZLj9PYnPnZypFdqambKzGBP9J5, i.e. program-controlled; the program's role lists were not decoded (no published account layout). The program is upgradeable (BPF Upgradeable Loader) and its upgrade authority DVTG4gHAAod4SVz69Li49tJ47myXtnixCVo6Ucn2N262 is a plain system account, so one key can replace the program that holds every mint authority. Softstack's Solana audit (23 Feb 2026) describes admin, minter, burner and freezer role lists in the program; it does not name the program address, so the link is not confirmed onchain.
Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗2 ↗
- Mint authority
Program-controlled; cap unreadVerified onchainDetailsDetails
mintAuthority = APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP, a program-controlled account of program Go6xKqsTwEWCsnzpW3ZLj9PYnPnZypFdqambKzGBP9J5. No cap at the mint level; any cap in the program was not read.
Authority APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP is a 4,817-byte data account owned by program Go6xKqsTwEWCsnzpW3ZLj9PYnPnZypFdqambKzGBP9J5, i.e. program-controlled; the program's role lists were not decoded (no published account layout). The program is upgradeable (BPF Upgradeable Loader) and its upgrade authority DVTG4gHAAod4SVz69Li49tJ47myXtnixCVo6Ucn2N262 is a plain system account, so one key can replace the program that holds every mint authority. Softstack's Solana audit (23 Feb 2026) describes admin, minter, burner and freezer role lists in the program; it does not name the program address, so the link is not confirmed onchain.
Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗2 ↗
- Burn
Holder, or permanent delegate anyVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Holders can burn their own balance (SPL standard); the permanent delegate APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP can burn any balance.
Authority APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP is a 4,817-byte data account owned by program Go6xKqsTwEWCsnzpW3ZLj9PYnPnZypFdqambKzGBP9J5, i.e. program-controlled; the program's role lists were not decoded (no published account layout). The program is upgradeable (BPF Upgradeable Loader) and its upgrade authority DVTG4gHAAod4SVz69Li49tJ47myXtnixCVo6Ucn2N262 is a plain system account, so one key can replace the program that holds every mint authority. Softstack's Solana audit (23 Feb 2026) describes admin, minter, burner and freezer role lists in the program; it does not name the program address, so the link is not confirmed onchain.
Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗2 ↗
- Admin
Program, upgradeable by one keyVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Mint, freeze, pause, permanent-delegate, metadata and close authorities: program-controlled account APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP. Program upgrade authority DVTG4gHAAod4SVz69Li49tJ47myXtnixCVo6Ucn2N262: single key. Transfer-fee and confidential-transfer authority H4VeZpuWiACqjbMEAWK5pLVnrVTJAzjkoZLNiybmX89q: system account (single key); transfer fee currently 0 bps.
Authority APJqyTzEng2jeLoyvRSZYgTpaZDBdxMetkvUSmvRMbTP is a 4,817-byte data account owned by program Go6xKqsTwEWCsnzpW3ZLj9PYnPnZypFdqambKzGBP9J5, i.e. program-controlled; the program's role lists were not decoded (no published account layout). The program is upgradeable (BPF Upgradeable Loader) and its upgrade authority DVTG4gHAAod4SVz69Li49tJ47myXtnixCVo6Ucn2N262 is a plain system account, so one key can replace the program that holds every mint authority. Softstack's Solana audit (23 Feb 2026) describes admin, minter, burner and freezer role lists in the program; it does not name the program address, so the link is not confirmed onchain.
Verified onchainapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗2 ↗
- Verified source
Not disclosedCheckedChecked
No verified-build record was checked: Solana explorers (explorer.solana.com, Solscan) were not reachable from this session. Program Go6xKqsTwEWCsnzpW3ZLj9PYnPnZypFdqambKzGBP9J5 bytecode was not compared with the audited source.
Checkedapi.mainnet-beta.solana.com ↗2 ↗framerusercontent.com ↗
Tempo
0x20C00000000000000000000042109aef2f8B28e1- Upgradeable
No; protocol tokenVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Not an issuer proxy: a TIP-20 token implemented by the Tempo protocol (code 0xef). Behaviour changes only with Tempo protocol upgrades.
Tempo TIP-20 token: eth_getCode returns the 1-byte placeholder 0xef (protocol precompile), so there is no issuer contract source. Roles are not enumerable (getRoleMemberCount reverts as an unknown selector); hasRole was checked only for AllUnity's EVM role holders and deployer.
Verified onchainrpc.tempo.xyz ↗
- Pause
Yes; admin EOAVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. PAUSE_ROLE and UNPAUSE_ROLE both held by EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f; paused() = false.
Tempo TIP-20 token: eth_getCode returns the 1-byte placeholder 0xef (protocol precompile), so there is no issuer contract source. Roles are not enumerable (getRoleMemberCount reverts as an unknown selector); hasRole was checked only for AllUnity's EVM role holders and deployer.
Verified onchainrpc.tempo.xyz ↗
- Freeze / blacklist
Yes; blocklist policy, EOA adminVerified onchainDetailsDetails
Yes. transferPolicyId() = 21: a TIP-403 policy of type 1 whose admin is EOA 0x72b604de032cb733e18d06d91ccc87bb4a9df637 (AllUnity's EVM blacklister); isAuthorized is true for an arbitrary address, consistent with a blocklist. BURN_BLOCKED_ROLE: no holder found among the addresses checked.
Tempo TIP-20 token: eth_getCode returns the 1-byte placeholder 0xef (protocol precompile), so there is no issuer contract source. Roles are not enumerable (getRoleMemberCount reverts as an unknown selector); hasRole was checked only for AllUnity's EVM role holders and deployer. Type-1 = blocklist is inferred from behaviour.
Verified onchainrpc.tempo.xyz ↗
- Mint authority
Single key, no effective capVerified onchainDetailsDetails
ISSUER_ROLE (mint and burn) held by EOAs 0xd443f0460c39194faaa06bcd018422fcc70178dd and 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7. supplyCap() = 2^128 - 1, the largest value, so no effective cap.
Tempo TIP-20 token: eth_getCode returns the 1-byte placeholder 0xef (protocol precompile), so there is no issuer contract source. Roles are not enumerable (getRoleMemberCount reverts as an unknown selector); hasRole was checked only for AllUnity's EVM role holders and deployer.
Verified onchainrpc.tempo.xyz ↗
- Burn
Issuer-role EOAsVerified onchainDetailsDetails
ISSUER_ROLE holders (0xd443f0460c39194faaa06bcd018422fcc70178dd, 0xb1b84dbd56883ffe998ca1fd0b0e2e4beccd37d7) burn; BURN_BLOCKED_ROLE (burn from blocked accounts) holder not identified.
Tempo TIP-20 token: eth_getCode returns the 1-byte placeholder 0xef (protocol precompile), so there is no issuer contract source. Roles are not enumerable (getRoleMemberCount reverts as an unknown selector); hasRole was checked only for AllUnity's EVM role holders and deployer.
Verified onchainrpc.tempo.xyz ↗
- Admin
Single key (EOA)Verified onchainDetailsDetails
DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (admin of every role): EOA 0xddaca43e3ae3a1485880a835edbf8924ab142b5f. All role holders found are EOAs.
Tempo TIP-20 token: eth_getCode returns the 1-byte placeholder 0xef (protocol precompile), so there is no issuer contract source. Roles are not enumerable (getRoleMemberCount reverts as an unknown selector); hasRole was checked only for AllUnity's EVM role holders and deployer.
Verified onchainrpc.tempo.xyz ↗
- Verified source
Not disclosedCheckedChecked
No contract source exists to verify: TIP-20 is a Tempo protocol precompile.
Checkedrpc.tempo.xyz ↗
Yield, audits and risks
- Yield
No (MiCAR bans interest)Issuer-statedDetailsDetails
No. As a MiCAR e-money token issuer AllUnity may not grant interest; holders have no claim to interest on the reserves (white paper D.1, Art. 50 MiCAR).
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗
- Audits
Softstack, Hacken, Oak Security (5 reports)Issuer-statedDetailsDetails
Softstack: AllUnity EVM stablecoin contracts, final 15 May 2025; Hacken: EVM contracts, final report 9 Jun 2025 (0 critical, 0 high); Oak Security: AllUnity and BlacklistManagement contracts, 11 Jul 2025 (minor findings; centralisation risk acknowledged); Softstack: Stellar (Soroban) contracts, final 15 Jan 2026; Softstack: Solana program, final 23 Feb 2026
Reports are the auditors' PDFs as published on AllUnity's Trust Center (not hosted by the auditors). The white papers (E.10) say no major/high or critical issues remained.
Issuer-statedallunity.com ↗framerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗4 ↗5 ↗
- Compliance
KYB/KYC on mint and redeem; blacklist usedIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
KYB/KYC and AML checks on direct issuance and redemption, including source of funds and sanctions screening (OFAC, UN, EU, Germany). Transfers to or from blacklisted addresses are invalid; the issuer may block tokens, withhold or cancel redemption, and surrender reserves for blocked tokens when required by law. No identity check on ordinary secondary transfers. EVM blacklist in use: 126 addresses blacklisted on Ethereum by 2026-10-29.
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗eth.blockscout.com ↗
- Disclosed risks
Recovery-plan limits; centralised token adminIssuer-statedDetailsDetails
White papers list under-collateralisation, secondary-market price dislocation, liquidity, bank counterparty, ICT, regulatory and conflict-of-interest risks (affiliates of shareholders may be Verified Institutions or reserve managers). Under a Recovery Plan, AllUnity may charge redemption fees, cap daily redemptions or suspend them. Issuer liability for simple negligence is capped at the lower of 0.1% of outstanding tokens and EUR 5 million a year; the issuer may substitute itself without holder consent. Oak Security's audit flags centralisation: the admin can upgrade with no timelock, and blacklister plus blacklisted-burner can burn a blacklisted balance (acknowledged).
Issuer-statedframerusercontent.com ↗2 ↗3 ↗
Links and contracts
Contracts
CHFAU contract addresses (6)
As listed on allunity.com ↗
- ArcLive since 1 Jun 20260xc6df1b92a6ae61a27059c41e541a91ce8dcb1605
- Base0xBD4DfC058eb95b8De5ceAF39966A1a70F5556F78
- EthereumLive since 3 Mar 20260xbd4dfc058eb95b8de5ceaf39966a1a70f5556f78
- Polygon0xBD4DfC058eb95b8De5ceAF39966A1a70F5556F78
- Solana3GJfXJvPcjuAu6VQZmcs9pAXQau8nz3z88CCpBztgQSv
- TempoLive since 13 May 2026
0x20C00000000000000000000042109aef2f8B28e1
Compiled from public issuer, regulator and explorer pages. Not advice. Confirm with the issuer before sending funds. Report a correction.